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INTRINSICALITY FOR MONISTS (AND
PLURALISTS)
Kelly Trogdon
Two competing views in sparse ontology are monism and pluralism. In
Trogdon [2009] I propose an account of intrinsicality that I argue is both
compatible with monism and pluralism and independently plausible. Skiles
[2009] argues that my account fails on both fronts. In this note I respond to his
two objections.
Let pluralism be the thesis that the properties of mereological atoms provide
the ultimate ground for the properties of complex objects, and monism be
the thesis that the properties of the world instead provide the ultimate
ground for the properties of all its proper parts. In Trogdon [2009] I propose
an account of intrinsicality that I claim is both independently plausible and
compatible with both monism and pluralism. What is the account?
The above formulations of monism and pluralism, as well as my account
of intrinsicality, appeal to the grounding or in virtue of relation. In Trogdon
[2009] I distinguish between what I call ‘intra-virtue-of’ and ‘inter-virtue-of’
relations. A property P of an object x is instantiated intra-virtue-of a
property Q of an object y just in case P is instantiated in virtue of Q and x
and y occupy the same mereological level. In contrast, P is instantiated inter-
virtue-of Q just in case P is instantiated in virtue of Q and x and y occupy
different mereological levels. And there I work with a very fine-grained
conception of mereological levels: x and y occupy the same mereological
level just in case x and y are composed of the same number of atoms. With
these notions in the background, my account of intrinsicality is as follows:
Intrinsic fashion: x has P in an intrinsic fashion just in case (i) P is independent
of accompaniment; and (ii) for any individual y and property Q, if x has P
intra-virtue-of y having Q, then Q is either fundamental or independent of
accompaniment.1
Intrinsicality: P is an intrinsic property (or relation) just in case P is
fundamental or, for any possible individual x, if x has P, x has P in an intrinsic
fashion.
1Following Langton and Lewis [1998]: x is accompanied just in case x co-exists with some wholly distinct
contingent object, and lonely otherwise. A property P is independent of accompaniment just in case it is
possible for a lonely object to have P, a lonely object to lack P, an accompanied object to have P, and an
accompanied object to lack P.
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Skiles [2009] argues that my account of intrinsicality is neither plausible nor
compatible with monism. I will consider each objection in turn.
My account says that any non-intrinsic property that is independent of
accompaniment is possibly instantiated intra-virtue-of some property that is
not independent of accompaniment. Consider the relational property being
a molecule (a complex object) such that there is an atom to which one is
attending (P). P is independent of accompaniment and intuitively non-
intrinsic, and Skiles claims that there is no property or relation Q such that
P is possibly instantiated intra-virtue-of Q, where Q is not independent of
accompaniment. Now consider the relation R, where R(x, y) just in case x is
a molecule, y is an atom wholly distinct from x, and x attends to y. Here
the assumption is that, following Armstrong [1997: 92], Jubien [1997: 38],
Hawthorne [2001], and others, there is a genuine ontological distinction
between relations (e.g. is the father of) on the one hand and corresponding
relational properties (e.g. being a father) on the other. Skiles points out that
someone, say, Frank, can have the property P in virtue of the instantiation
of the relation R, and R obviously is not independent of accompaniment.
The in virtue of relation between P and R, however, is an inter-virtue-of
relation since its relata occupy different mereological levels. Generalizing
from this example, Skiles claims that there is no property or relation (more
specifically, an intra-virtue-of relation to some property or relation that is
not independent of accompaniment) for P to ‘go non-intrinsic’ by on my
account. If this is right, then my account classifies an intuitively non-
intrinsic property as being intrinsic.
The problem with this objection, however, is that the result does not seem
to generalize, and it is easy to see why. For consider the relational property
being a molecule such that there is a wholly distinct atom to which one is
attending (P*). P and P* together are possibly instantiated by Frank, and if
Frank instantiates them, intuitively the former is instantiated in virtue of the
latter. It seems, therefore, that there is a possible case in which P is
instantiated intra-virtue-of a property that is not independent of accom-
paniment, so my account classifies P as non-intrinsic.2
Let us move on, then, to Skiles’ second objection. Here the objection is
that, on my account of intrinsicality, the monist in particular is committed
to classifying properties that are intuitively intrinsic as being non-intrinsic.
This objection is more complicated than the first one and requires some
stage setting. In particular, I need to quickly recount five relevant (and
controversial) claims I make in Trogdon [2009]. First, the theses of monism
and pluralism are, if true, necessarily true. Second, according to monism, the
fundamental properties are maximally specific distributional properties.
Third, if a property P is instantiated in a world w, then P is fundamental in
w only if P is not instantiated in virtue of (either intra-virtue-of or inter-
virtue-of) any other property in w. Fourth, whether a property is funda-
mental or not is an essential feature of it and, therefore, property
2Perhaps P and P* can both be instantiated inter-virtue-of R. This, however, is not a problem, for there is no
reason to think that P and P* being instantiated inter-virtue-of R ‘screens off’ P being instantiated intra-
virtue-of P*.
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fundamentality is not world-relative. Fifth, fundamental properties are
intrinsic.
With these claims in the background, Skiles objects as follows. Suppose
that x is a proper part of the actual world, @, x exemplifies a distributional
property P such that P completely specifies the mereological structure of x
and the nature of its proper parts, and P is intuitively intrinsic. Suppose, for
reductio, that P is indeed intrinsic. Let w be a possible world that is a
contraction of @, where w¼ x. Since P is intrinsic and non-fundamental,
my account says that P is independent of accompaniment. It follows that it
is possible for a lonely individual to have P. w considered above is lonely, so
suppose that w instantiates P. Supposing that monism is true in @, it is true
in w as well. Hence, P, qua maximally specific distributional property of w,
is fundamental in w. Since fundamentality is essential and P is instantia-
ted in @, it follows that P is fundamental in @ as well. But P is not
fundamental in @, since P is instantiated by a proper part of @. By reductio,
P is not intrinsic after all.
How to respond to this objection? We are stipulating that P is instantiated
by a proper part of @, and P is instantiated by an improper part of w.
So far, so good. What I disagree with, however, is the claim that P is
fundamental in w. To see why, let me first say something more about what it
is to be a maximally specific global distributional property.
Now, whether or not monism is true, each possible world instantiates one
and only one maximally specific distributional property. Why just one?
Well, if property P* is a maximally specific distributional property instan-
tiated by w, then P* has two features. First, it specifies (i) the proper parts a,
b, c etc. of w and their properties, (ii) the other properties instantiated by w
(the other global properties), and (iii) the relations a, b, c, etc. and w stand in
to one another. Let us say that P* is ‘comprehensive’ in this sense. Second,
P* tells us that a, b, c, etc. are all the proper parts of the world that
instantiates it; it tells us that there are no more proper parts. (It says the same
thing about the properties and relations just mentioned, but we can put this
to the side for now.) Let us say that P* is ‘exhaustive’ in this sense.3 Since
only one property can be both comprehensive and exhaustive for any world,
each world instantiates only one maximally specific global distributional
property.
Returning to the debate between the monist and the pluralist, they both
agree that fixing the maximally specific global distributional property of
each world fixes how that world is in its entirety. This fact about meta-
physical entailment is not under dispute. What is under dispute, however, is
whether maximally specific global distributional properties are fundamental.
The question is not whether the instantiation of P* from above by w
necessitates the instantiation of various other properties by w and its proper
parts, but whether the latter are ultimately grounded in the former. The
monist (at least on the version of monism I think most plausible) claims that
any property instantiated by w or a proper part of w that is instantiated in
3Since P* is exhaustive, its instantiation by w necessitates the instantiation of global properties corresponding
to universal truths such as the property being such that all Fs are Gs. Comprehensiveness alone does not have
this consequence.
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virtue of another property is ultimately grounded in P*, while the pluralist
denies that this is the case.
Supposing that monism is true, P*—w’s maximally specific global
distributional property—is fundamental. Since P* is exhaustive, it is not
instantiated by @ or any proper part of @, so P* obviously is not
instantiated both in @ and by w. But P from above is instantiated by a
proper part of @ and by w, so P and P* are different properties. Assuming
that P* is the fundamental property of w, what is the relation between P*
and P in w? The thing to say, it would seem, is that P is instantiated intra-
virtue-of w instantiating P*.
In Trogdon [2009] I was not as clear as I should have been that
fundamental properties for the monist, qua maximally specific distributional
properties, are exhaustive in addition to comprehensive. If fundamental
properties in this context were merely comprehensive, it would make sense
to say that P is fundamental in w. After all, P, qua comprehensive property,
covers everything about w. But if I am right that the monist should also
claim that fundamental properties are exhaustive, then, once we see that
P is not exhaustive because it is instantiated by a proper part of @, we can
see that P is not fundamental in w after all.4 I conclude, therefore, that, so
long as the monist claims that fundamental properties are both compre-
hensive and exhaustive, Skiles’ objection that my account of intrinsicality is
incompatible with monism fails.5
Lingnan University Received: May 2009
Revised: July 2009
References
Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hawthorne, J. 2001. Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
58/2: 399–403.
Jubien, M. 1997. Contemporary Metaphysics, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Langton, R. and D. Lewis. 1998. Defining ‘Intrinsic’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58/2:
333–45.
Sider, T. 2001. Maximality and Intrinsic Properties, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63/2: 357–63.
Skiles, A. 2009. Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87/1: 149–54.
Trogdon, K. 2009. Monism and Intrinsicality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87/1: 127–48.
Trogdon, K. Unpublished ms. Grounding, Border-Sensitivity, and Intrinsicality.
4Properties that are comprehensive and exhaustive, you might argue, are akin to what Sider [2001] calls
‘border-sensitive’ properties and are therefore non-intrinsic. If comprehensive and exhaustive properties are
non-intrinsic and I am right that fundamental properties are intrinsic, then the monist is in trouble. In
Trogdon [unpublished] I argue, however, that it may be a mistake to think that if a property is border-
sensitive it is thereby non-intrinsic.
5I would like to thank Sam Cowling, Maya Eddon, Barak Krakauer, Alex Skiles, Ellen Woodall, and two
anonymous referees at AJP for helpful comments.
558 Kelly Trogdon
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Tr
og
do
n,
 K
el
ly
] 
At
: 
10
:0
8 
28
 S
ep
te
mb
er
 2
01
0
